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Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with
asymmetric information
Deepanshu Vasal and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Abstract
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take
actions, which are publicly observed. Players’ types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes
and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) game with
asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions, players’ strategies that are linear in their private
types, together with Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Furthermore, it is
shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact that future beliefs on players’ types are affected by the
equilibrium strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step of the backward
algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for every possible realization of the state estimate
covariance matrix. The forward algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance
matrices depend on equilibrium strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) team problems have been studied extensively under the framework
of classical stochastic control with single controller and perfect recall [1, Ch.7]. In such a system, the
state evolves linearly and the controller makes a noisy observation of the state which is also linear in the
state and noise. The controller incurs a quadratic instantaneous cost. With all basic random variables
being independent and Gaussian, the problem is modeled as a partially observed Markov decision
process (POMDP). The belief state process under any control law happens to be Gaussian and thus can
be sufficiently described by the corresponding mean and covariance processes, which can be updated
by the Kalman filter equations. Moreover, the covariance can be computed offline and thus the mean
(state estimate) is a sufficient statistic for control. Finally, due to the quadratic nature of the costs, the
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optimal control strategy is linear in the state. Thus, unlike most POMDP problems, the LQG stochastic
control problem can be solved analytically and admits an easy-to-implement optimal strategy.
LQG team problems have also been studied under non-classical information structure such as in
multi-agent decentralized team problems where two controllers with different information sets minimize
the same objective. Such systems with asymmetric information structure are of special interest today
because of the emergence of large scale networks such as social or power networks, where there are
multiple decision makers with local or partial information about the system. It is well known that
for decentralized LQG team problems, linear control policies are not optimal in general [2]. However
there exist special information structures, such as partially nested [3] and stochastically nested [4], where
linear control is shown to be optimal. Furthermore, due to their strong appeal for ease of implementation,
linear strategies have been studied on their own for decentralized teams even at the possibility of being
suboptimal (see [5] and references therein).
When controllers (or players) are strategic, the problem is classified as a dynamic game and an
appropriate solution concept is some notion of equilibrium. When players have different information
sets, such games are called games with asymmetric information. There are several notions of equilibrium
for such games, including perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, trembling hand
equilibrium [6], [7]. Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a strategy and a belief profile of
all players where the equilibrium strategies are optimal given the beliefs and the beliefs are derived
from the equilibrium strategy profile and using Bayes’ rule (whenever possible), with some equilibrium
concepts requiring further refinements. Due to this circular argument of beliefs being consistent with
strategies which are in turn optimal given the beliefs, finding such equilibria is a difficult task. To date,
there is no known sequential decomposition methodology to find such equilibria for general dynamic
games with asymmetric information.
Authors in [8] studied a discrete-time dynamic LQG game with one step delayed sharing of
observations. Authors in [9] studied a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information under
the assumption that player’s posterior beliefs about the system state conditioned on their common
information are independent of the strategies used by the players in the past. Due to this independence
of beliefs and past strategies, the authors of [9] were able to provide a backward recursive algorithm
similar to dynamic programming to find Markov perfect equilibria [11] of a transformed game which
are equivalently a class of Nash equilibria of the original game. The same authors specialized their
results in [12] to find non-signaling equilibria of dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information.
Recently, we considered a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information and
independent private types in [13] and provided a sequential decomposition methodology to find a class of
PBE of the game considered. In our model, beliefs depend on the players’ strategies, so our methodology
allows the possibility of finding signaling equilibria. In this paper, we build on this methodology to find
signaling equilibria for two-player dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information. We show that
players’ strategies that are linear in their private types in conjunction with consistent Gaussian beliefs
form a PBE of the game. Our contributions are:
(a) Under strategies that are linear in players’ private types, we show that the belief updates are
Gaussian and the corresponding mean and covariance are updated through Kalman filtering
equations which depend on the players’ strategies, unlike the case in classical stochastic control
and the model considered in [12]. Thus there is signaling [14], [15].
(b) We sequentially decompose the problem by specializing the forward-backward algorithm presented
in [13] for the dynamic LQG model. The backward algorithm requires, at each step, solving a fixed
point equation in ‘partial’ strategies of the players for all possible beliefs. We show that in this
setting, solving this fixed point equation reduces to solving a matrix algebraic equation for each
realization of the state estimate covariance matrices.
(c) The cost-to-go value functions are shown to be quadratic in the private type and state estimates,
which together with quadratic instantaneous costs and mean updates being linear in the control
action, implies that at every time t player i faces an optimization problem which is quadratic in
her control. Thus linear control strategies are shown to satisfy the optimality conditions in [13].
(d) For the special case of scalar actions, we provide sufficient algorithmic conditions for existence
of a solution of the algebraic matrix equation. Finally, we present numerical results on the steady
state solution for specific parameters of the problem.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we define the model. In Section III, we introduce the
solution concept and summarize the general methodology in [13]. In Section IV, we present our main
results where we construct equilibrium strategies and belief through a forward-backward recursion. In
Section V we discuss existence issues and present numerical steady state solutions. We conclude in
Section VI.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. We use bold upper
case letters for matrices. For any variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent
player identities. We use notation −i to represent the player other than player i. We use notation at:t′
to represent vector (at, at+1, . . . at′) when t′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t′ < t. We remove superscripts
or subscripts if we want to represent the whole vector, for example at represents (a1t , a2t ). We use δ(·)
for the Dirac delta function. We use the notation X ∼ F to denote that the random variable X has
distribution F . For any Euclidean set S, P(S) represents the space of probability measures on S with
respect to the Borel sigma algebra. We denote by P g (or Eg) the probability measure generated by
(or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g. We denote the set of real numbers by R. For any
random vector X and event A, we use the notation sm(·|·) to denote the conditional second moment,
sm(X|A) := E[XX†|A]. For any matrices A and B, we will also use the notation quad(·; ·) to denote
the quadratic function, quad(A;B) := B†AB. We denote trace of a matrix A by tr(A). N(xˆ,Σ)
represents the vector Gaussian distribution with mean vector xˆ and covariance matrix Σ. All equalities
and inequalities involving random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense and inequalities in matrices
are to be interpreted in the sense of positive definitedness. All matrix inverses are interpreted as pseudo-
inverses.
II. MODEL
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with 2 strategic players over a finite time horizon
T := {1, 2, . . . T} and with perfect recall. There is a dynamic state of the system xt := (x1t , x2t ), where
xit ∈ X
i := Rni is private type of player i at time t which is perfectly observed by her. Player i at time t
takes action uit ∈ U i := Rmi after observing u1:t−1, which is common information between the players,
and xi1:t, which it observes privately. Thus at any time t ∈ T , player i’s information is u1:t−1, xi1:t.
Players’ types evolve linearly as
xit+1 = A
i
tx
i
t +B
i
tut + w
i
t, (1)
where Ait,Bit are known matrices. (X11 , X21 , (W it )t∈T ) are basic random variables of the system which
are assumed to be independent and Gaussian such that X i1 ∼ N(0,Σi1) and W it ∼ N(0,Qi). As a
consequence, types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes,
P (xt+1|u1:t, x1:t) = P (xt+1|ut, xt) =
2∏
i=1
Qi(xit+1|ut, x
i
t). (2)
where Qi(xit+1|ut, xit) := P (wit = xit+1 − Aitxit − Bitut). At the end of interval t, player i incurs an
instantaneous cost Ri(xt, ut),
Ri(xt, ut) = u
†
tT
iut + x
†
tP
ixt + 2u
†
tS
ixt
=
[
u†t x
†
t
]Ti Si
Si† Pi



ut
xt

 , (3)
where Ti,Pi,Si are real matrices of appropriate dimensions and Ti,Pi are symmetric. We define the
instantaneous cost matrix Ri as Ri :=

Ti Si
Si† Pi

. Let gi = (git)t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player
i, where git : (U i)t−1 × (X i)t → P(U i) such that player i plays action uit according to distribution
git(·|u1:t−1, x
i
1:t). Let g := (gi)i=1,2 be a strategy profile of both players. The distribution of the basic
random variables and their independence structure together with the system evolution in (1) and players
strategy profile g define a joint distribution on all random variables involved in the dynamical process.
The objective of player i is to maximize her total expected cost
J i,g := Eg
{
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, Ut)
}
. (4)
With both players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic LQG game with asymmetric
information and with simultaneous moves.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce the equilibrium concept for dynamic games with asymmetric information
and summarize the general methodology developed in [13] to find a class of such equilibria.
A. Solution concept
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (u1:t−1, x1:t). Let Ht be the
set of such histories at time t and H := ∪Tt=0Ht be the set of all possible such histories. At any time t
player i observes hit = (u1:t−1, xi1:t) and both players together have hct = u1:t−1 as common history. Let
Hit be the set of observed histories of player i at time t and Hct be the set of common histories at time t.
An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is the PBE [7] which consists of a pair (β∗, µ∗)
of strategy profile β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i=1,2 where β
∗,i
t : H
i
t → P(U
i) and a belief profile µ∗ = (µ∗,it )t∈T ,i=1,2
where µ∗,it : Hit → P(Ht) that satisfy sequential rationality so that for i = 1, 2, ∀t ∈ T , hit ∈ Hit, βi
E
(β∗,iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, Un)
∣∣∣hit
}
≤ E(β
iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, Un)
∣∣∣hit
}
, (5)
and the beliefs satisfy consistency conditions as described in [7, p. 331].
B. Structured perfect Bayesian equilibria
A general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information was considered in [13] by the authors
where players’ types evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov processes. A backward-
forward algorithm was provided to find a class of PBE of the game called structured perfect Bayesian
equilibria (SPBE). In these equilibria, player i’s strategy is of the form U it ∼ mit(·|pi1t , pi2t , xit) where
mit : P(X
1)×P(X 2)×X i → P(U i). Specifically, player i’s action at time t depends on her private history
xi1:t only through xit. Furthermore, it depends on the common information u1:t−1 through a common
belief vector pit := (pi1t , pi2t ) where piit ∈ P(X i) is belief on player i’s current type xit conditioned on
common information u1:t−1, i.e. piit(xit) := P g(X it = xit|u1:t−1).
The common information u1:t−1 was summarized into the belief vector (pi1t , pi2t ) following the common
agent approach used for dynamic decentralized team problems [16]. Using this approach, player i’s
strategy can be equivalently described as follows: player i at time t observes u1:t−1 and takes action
γit , where γit : X i → P(U i) is a partial (stochastic) function from her private information xit to uit of
the form U it ∼ γit(·|xit). These actions are generated through some policy ψi = (ψit)t∈T , ψit : (U i)t−1 →
{X i → P(U i)}, that operates on the common information u1:t−1 so that γit = ψit[u1:t−1]. Then any policy
of the player i of the form U it ∼ git(·|u1:t−1, xit) is equivalent to U it ∼ ψit[u1:t−1](·|xit) [16].
The common belief piit is shown in Lemma 2 of [13] to be updated as
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∫
xit
piit(x
i
t)γ
i
t(u
i
t|x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, ut)dx
i
t∫
x˜it
piit(x˜
i
t)γ
i
t(u
i
t|x˜
i
t)dx˜
i
t
, (6a)
if the denominator is not 0, and as
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∫
xit
piit(x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, ut)dx
i
t, (6b)
if the denominator is 0. The belief update can be summarized as,
piit+1 = F¯ (pi
i
t, γ
i
t, ut), (7)
where F¯ is independent of players’ strategy profile g. The SPBE of the game can be found through a
two-step backward-forward algorithm. In the backward recursive part, an equilibrium generating function
θ is defined based on which a strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) are defined through a forward recursion.
In the following we summarize the algorithm and results of [13].
1) Backward Recursion: An equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i=1,2,t∈T and a sequence of value
functions (V it )i=1,2,t∈{1,2,...T+1} are defined through backward recursion, where θit : P(X 1)× P(X 2)→
{X i → P(U i)}, V it : P(X
1)×P(X 2)× X i → R, as follows.
(a) Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X 1)×P(X 2), xiT+1 ∈ X i,
V iT+1(piT+1, x
i
T+1) := 0. (8)
(b) For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1,
∀pit ∈ P(X
1)×P(X 2), let θt[pit] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[pit] where γ˜t is the solution
of the following fixed point equation, ∀i ∈ N , xit ∈ X i,
γ˜it(·|x
i
t) ∈ arg min
γit(·|x
i
t)
E
γit(·|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t
{
Ri(Xt, Ut) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, Ut), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣pit, xit} , (9)
where expectation in (9) is with respect to random variables (x−it , ut, xit+1) through the measure
pi−it (x
−i
t )γ
i
t(u
i
t|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t (u
−i
t |x
−i
t )Q
i(xit+1|x
i
t, ut) and F (pit, γt, ut) := (F¯ (pi1t , γ1t , ut), F¯ (pi2t , γ2t , ut)) .
Also define
V it (pit, x
i
t) := E
γ˜it(·|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t
{
Ri(Xt, Ut) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, Ut), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣pit, xit} . (10)
From the equilibrium generating function θ defined though this backward recursion, the equilibrium
strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) are defined as follows.
2) Forward Recursion:
(a) Initialize at time t = 1,
µ∗1[φ](x1) :=
N∏
i=1
Qi(xi1). (11)
(b) For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, u1:t ∈ Hct+1, xi1:t ∈ (X i)t
β
∗,i
t (u
i
t|u1:t−1x
i
1:t) := θ
i
t[µ
∗
t [u1:t−1]](u
i
t|x
i
t) (12)
and
µ
∗,i
t+1[u1:t] := F¯ (µ
∗,i
t [u1:t−1], θ
i
t[µ
∗
t [u1:t−1]], ut) (13a)
µ∗t+1[u1:t](x
1
t , x
2
t ) :=
2∏
i=1
µ
∗,i
t+1[u1:t](x
i
t). (13b)
The strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) thus constructed form an SPBE of the game [13, Theorem 1].
IV. SPBE OF THE DYNAMIC LQG GAME
In this section, we apply the general methodology for finding SPBE described in the previous section,
on the specific dynamic LQG game model described in Section II. We show that players’ strategies that
are linear in their private types in conjunction with Gaussian beliefs, form an SPBE of the game. We
prove this result by constructing an equilibrium generating function θ using backward recursion such
that for all Gaussian belief vectors pit, γ˜t = θt[pit], γ˜it is of the form γ˜it(uit|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxi − m˜it) and
satisfies (9). Based on θ, we construct an equilibrium belief and strategy profile.
The following lemma shows that common beliefs remain Gaussian under linear deterministic γt of
the form γit(uit|xit) = δ(uit − Litxit −mit).
Lemma 1: If piit is a Gaussian distribution with mean xˆit and covariance Σit, and γit(uit|xit) = δ(uit −
Litx
i
t −m
i
t) then piit+1, given by (6), is also Gaussian distribution with mean xˆit+1 and covariance Σit+1,
where
xˆit+1 = A
i
txˆ
i
t +B
i
tut +A
i
tG
i
t(u
i
t − L
i
txˆ
i
t −m
i
t) (14a)
Σit+1 = A
i
t(I−G
i
tL
i
t)
†Σit(I−G
i
tL
i
t)A
i†
t +Q
i, (14b)
where
Git = Σ
i
tL
i†
t (L
i
tΣ
i
tL
i†
t )
−1. (15)
Proof: See Appendix I
Based on previous lemma, we define φix, φis as update functions of mean and covariance matrix,
respectively, as defined in (14), such that
xˆit+1 = φ
i
x(xˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,L
i
t, m
i
t, ut) (16a)
Σit+1 = φ
i
s(Σ
i
t,L
i
t). (16b)
We also say,
xˆt+1 = φx(xˆt,Σt,Lt, mt, ut) (17)
Σt+1 = φs(Σt,Lt). (18)
The previous lemma shows that with linear deterministic γit , the next update of the mean of the common
belief, xˆit+1 is linear in xˆit and the control action uit. Furthermore, these updates are given by appropriate
Kalman filter equations. It should be noted however that the covariance update in (14b) depends on the
strategy through γit and specifically through the matrix Lit. This specifically shows how belief updates
depend on strategies on the players which leads to signaling, unlike the case in classical stochastic
control and the model considered in [12].
Now we will construct an equilibrium generating function θ using the backward recursion in (8)–(10).
The θ function generates linear deterministic partial functions γt, which, from Lemma 1 and the fact
that initial beliefs (or priors) are Gaussian, generates only Gaussian belief vectors (pi1t , pi2t )t∈T for the
whole time horizon. These beliefs can be sufficiently described by their mean and covariance processes
(xˆ1t ,Σ
1
t )t∈T and (xˆ2t ,Σ2t )t∈T which are updated using (14).
For t = T + 1, T, . . . , 1, we define the vectors
eit :=


xit
xˆ1t
xˆ2t

 zit :=


uit
xit
xˆ1t
xˆ2t


yit :=


u1t
u2t
x1t
x2t
xit+1
xˆ1t+1
xˆ2t+1


. (19)
Theorem 1: The backward recursion (8)–(10) admits1 a solution of the form θt[pit] = θt[xˆt,Σt] =
γ˜t where γ˜it(uit|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxit − m˜it) and L˜it, m˜it are appropriately defined matrices and vectors,
respectively. Furthermore, the value function reduces to
V it (pit, x
i
t) = V
i
t (xˆt,Σt, x
i
t) (20a)
= quad(Vit(Σt); e
i
t) + ρ
i
t(Σt). (20b)
with Vit(Σt) and ρit(Σt) as appropriately defined matrix and scalar quantities, respectively.
Proof: We construct such a θ function through the backward recursive construction and prove the
properties of the corresponding value functions inductively.
(a) For i = 1, 2, ∀ ΣT+1, let ViT+1(ΣT+1) := 0, ρiT+1(ΣT+1) := 0. Then ∀ xˆ1T+1, xˆ2T+1,
Σ1T+1,Σ
2
T+1, x
i
T+1 and for pit = (pi1t , pi2t ), where piit is N(xˆit,Σit),
V iT+1(piT+1, x
i
T+1) := 0 (21a)
= V iT+1(xˆT+1,ΣT+1, x
i
T+1) (21b)
= quad(ViT+1(ΣT+1), e
i
T+1) + ρ
i
T+1(ΣT+1). (21c)
(b) For all t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . , 1}, i = 1, 2,
Suppose V it+1(pit+1, xit+1) = quad(Vit+1(Σt+1), eit+1) + ρit+1(Σt+1) (from induction hypothesis)
1Under certain conditions, stated in the proof.
where Vit+1 is a symmetric matrix defined recursively. Define V¯it as
V¯it(Σt,Lt) :=


Ti Si 0
Si† Pi 0
0 0 Vit+1(φs(Σt,Lt))

 . (22)
Since Ti,Pi are symmetric by assumption, V¯it is also symmetric.
For ease of exposition, we will assume i = 1 and for player 2, a similar argument holds. At time
t, the quantity that is minimized for player i = 1 in (9) can be written as
E
γ1t (·|x
1
t )
[
E
γ˜2t
[
R1(Xt, Ut) + V
1
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, Ut), X
1
t+1)
∣∣∣pit, x1t , u1t] ∣∣∣pit, x1t ] . (23)
The inner expectation can be written as follows, where γ˜2t (u2t |x2t ) = δ(u2t − L˜2tx2t − m˜2t ),
E
γ˜2t

quad



T1 S1
S1† P1

 ; zit

 + quad(V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t)); eit+1)+ ρ1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))∣∣∣pit, x1t , uit


(24a)
= Eγ˜
2
t
[
quad
(
V¯1t (Σt, L˜t); y
1
t
)
+ ρ1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))
∣∣∣pit, x1t , u1t] (24b)
= quad

V¯1t (Σt, L˜t);D1tz1t +C1t

m1t
m˜2t



+ ρ1t (Σt), (24c)
where V¯it is defined in (22) and function φs is defined in (18); yit, zit are defined in (19); ρit is given
by
ρit(Σt) = tr
(
Σ−it quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t);J
i
t
))
+ tr(QiV i11,t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))) + ρ
i
t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t)), (25)
where V i11,t+1 is the matrix corresponding to xit+1 in V it+1 i.e. in the first row and first column of
the matrix V it+1; and matrices Dit,Cit,Jit are as follows,
D1t :=


I 0 0 0
0 0 0 L˜2t
0 I 0 0
0 0 0 I
B11,t A
1
t 0 B
1
2,tL˜
2
t
A1tG
1
t +B
1
1,t 0 A
1
t (I−G
1
tL
1
t ) B
1
2,tL˜
2
t
B21,t 0 0 A
2
t +B
2
2,tL˜
2
t


(26a)
D2t :=


0 0 L˜1t 0
I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 I 0 0
B22,t A
2
t B
2
1,tL˜
1
t 0
B12,t 0 A
1
t +B
1
1,tL˜
1
t 0
A2tG
2
t +B
2
2,t 0 B
2
1,tL˜
1
t A
2
t (I−G
2
tL
2
t )


(26b)
C1t :=


0 0
0 I
0 0
0 0
0 B12,t
−A1tG
1
t B
1
2,t
0 B22,t


C2t :=


I 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
B21,t 0
B11,t 0
B21,t −A
2
tG
2
t


(27)
J
1†
t :=
[
0 L2t 0 I B
1
2,tL
2
t B
1
2,tL
2
t (B
2
2,t +A
2
tG
2
t )L
2
t
]†
J
2†
t :=
[
L1t 0 I 0 B
2
1,tL
1
t (B
1
1,t +A
1
tG
1
t )L
1
t B
2
1,tL
1
t
]†
(28)
where Bit =:
[
Bi1,t B
i
2,t
]
, Bi1,t,B
i
2,t are the parts of the matrix Bit that corresponds to u1t , u2t
respectively. Let D1t =:
[
Du1t D
e1
t
]
where Du1t is the first column matrix of D1t corresponding
to u1t and De1t is the matrix composed of remaining three column matrices of D1t corresponding
to e1t . The expression in (24c) is averaged with respect to u1t using the measure γ1t (·|x1t ) and
minimized in (9) over γ1t (·|x1t ). This minimization can be performed component wise leading to
a deterministic policy γ˜1t (u1t |x1t ) = δ(u1t − L˜1tx1t − m˜1t ) = δ(u1t − u1∗t ), assuming that the matrix
D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t D˜
u1
t is positive definite2. In that case, the unique minimizer u1∗t = L˜1tx1t + m˜1t can be found
by differentiating (24c) w.r.t. u1†t and equating it to 0, resulting in the equation,
0 = 2
[
I 0 0 0
]
D˜
1†
t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜1t z
1
t + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
(29a)
0 = D˜u1†t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜u1t u
1∗
t + D˜
e1
t e
1
t + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
(29b)
0 = D˜u1†t V¯
1
t (Σt, L˜t)
(
D˜u1t (L˜
1
tx
1
t + m˜
1
t ) + [D˜
e1
t ]1x
1
t + [D˜
e1
t ]23xˆt + C˜
1
t m˜t
)
, (29c)
where [Dei]1 is the first matrix column of Dei, [Dei]23 is the matrix composed of the second and
third column matrices of Dei. Matrices D˜it, C˜it are obtained by substituting L˜it, G˜it in place of Lit,Git
in the definition of D˜it, C˜it in (27), respectively, and G˜it is the matrix obtained by substituting L˜it
in place of Lit in (15).
Thus (29c) is equivalent to (9) and with a similar analysis for player 2, it implies that L˜it is solution
of the following algebraic fixed point equation,
(
D˜
ui†
t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)D˜
ui
t
)
L˜it = −D˜
ui†
t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)[D˜
ei
t ]1. (30a)
2This condition is true if the instantaneous cost matrix Ri =
[
T
i
S
i
S
i†
P
i
]
is positive definite and can be proved inductively in the proof
by showing that Vit and V¯it are positive definite.
For player 1, it reduces to,
T
1
11 +


B11,t
A1tG
1
t +B
1
1,t
B21,t


†
V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))


B11,t
A1tG
1
t +B
1
1,t
B21,t



 L˜
1
t
= −

S
1†
11 +


B11,t
A1tG
1
t +B
1
1,t
B21,t


†
V1t+1(φs(Σt, L˜t))


A1t
0
0



 , (30b)
and a similar expression holds for player 2.
In addition, m˜t can be found from (29c) as
D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t D˜
u1
t 0
0 D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t D˜
u2
t

 m˜t = −

D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t [D˜
e1
t ]23
D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t [D˜
e2
t ]23

 xˆt −

D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t C˜
1
t
D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t C˜
2
t

 m˜t (31a)
m˜t = −



D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t D˜
u1
t 0
0 D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t D˜
u2
t

+

D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t C˜
1
t
D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t C˜
2
t




−1 
D˜
u1†
t V¯
1
t [D˜
e1
t ]23
D˜
u2†
t V¯
2
t [D˜
e2
t ]23

 xˆt (31b)
=: M˜txˆt =:

M˜1t
M˜2t

 xˆt, (31c)
Finally, the resulting cost for player i is,
V it (pit, x
i
t) = V
i
t (xˆt,Σt, x
i
t) (32a)
:= quad

V¯it(Σt, L˜t); [D˜uit D˜eit ]

L˜itxit + M˜itxˆt
eit

+ C˜itM˜txˆt

+ ρit(Σt) (32b)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t); D˜
ui
t (L˜
i
tx
i
t + M˜
i
txˆt) + D˜
e1
t e
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜txˆt
)
+ ρit(Σt) (32c)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t);
([
D˜uit L˜
i
t D˜
ui
t M˜
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜t
]
+ D˜eit
)
eit
)
+ ρit(Σt) (32d)
= quad
(
V¯it(Σt, L˜t); F˜
i
te
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt) (32e)
= quad
(
F˜
i†
t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)F˜
i
t; e
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt) (32f)
= quad
(
Vit(Σt); e
i
t
)
+ ρit(Σt), (32g)
where,
F˜it :=
[
D˜uit L˜
i
t D˜
ui
t M˜
i
t + C˜
i
tM˜t
]
+ D˜eit (33a)
Vit(Σt) := F˜
i†
t V¯
i
t(Σt, L˜t)F˜
i
t. (33b)
Since V¯it is symmetric, so is Vit. Thus the induction step is completed.
Taking motivation from the previous theorem and with slight abuse of notation, we define
γ˜t = θt[pit] = θt[xˆt,Σt], (34)
and since γ˜it(uit|xit) = δ(uit − L˜itxit − m˜it), we define a reduced mapping (θL, θm) as
θLit [xˆt,Σt] = θ
Li
t [Σt] := L˜
i
t and θmit [xˆt,Σt] := m˜it, (35)
where L˜it does not depend on xˆt and m˜it is linear in xˆt and is of the form m˜it = M˜itxˆt.
Now we construct the equilibrium strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) through the forward recursion
in (11)–(13b), using the equilibrium generating function θ ≡ (θL, θm).
(a) Let
µ
∗,i
1 [φ](x
i
1) = N(0,Σ
i
1). (36)
(b) For t = 1, 2 . . . T−1, ∀u1:t ∈ Hct+1, if µ∗,it [u1:t−1] = N(xˆit,Σit), let L˜it = θLit [Σt], m˜it = θmit [xˆt,Σt] =
M˜itxˆ. Then ∀xi1:t ∈ (X i)t
β
∗,i
t (u
i
t|u1:t−1x
i
1:t) := δ(u
i
t − L˜
i
tx
i
t − M˜
i
txˆt) (37a)
µ
∗,i
t+1[u1:t] := N(xˆ
i
t+1,Σ
i
t+1) (37b)
µ∗t+1[u1:t](x
1
t , x
2
t ) :=
2∏
i=1
µ
∗,i
t+1[u1:t](x
i
t), (37c)
where xˆit+1 = φix(xˆit, L˜it, m˜it, ut) and Σit+1 = φis(Σit, L˜it).
Theorem 2: (β∗, µ∗) constructed above is a PBE of the dynamic LQG game.
Proof: The strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) is constructed using the forward recursion steps
(11)–(13b) on equilibrium generating function θ, which is defined through backward recursion steps
(8)–(10) implemented in the proof Theorem 1. Thus the result is directly implied by Theorem 1 in [13].
V. DISUSSION
A. Existence
In the proof of Theorem 1, D˜u1†t V¯1t D˜u1t is assumed to be positive definite. This can be achieved if
Ri is positive definite, through which it can be easily shown inductively in the proof of Theorem 1 that
the matrices V1t , V¯1t are also positive definite.
Constructing the equilibrium generating function θ involves solving the algebraic fixed point equation
in (30) for L˜t for all Σt. In general, the existence is not guaranteed, as is the case for existence of γ˜t
in (9) for general dynamic games with asymmetric information. At this point, we don’t have a general
proof for existence. However, in the following lemma, we provide sufficient conditions on the matrices
Ait,B
i
t,T
i,Si,Pi,Vit+1 and for the case mi = 1, for a solution to exist.
Lemma 2: For m1 = m2 = 1, there exists a solution to (30) if and only if for i = 1, 2, ∃ li ∈ Rni
such that li†∆i(l1, l2)li ≥ 0, or sufficiently ∆i(l1, l2)+∆i,†(l1, l2) is positive definite, where ∆i, i = 1, 2
are defined in Appendix II.
Proof: See Appendix II.
B. Steady state
In Section III, we presented the backward/forward methodology to find SPBE for finite time-
horizon dynamic games, and specialized that methodology in this chapter, in Section IV, to find
SPBE for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information, where equilibrium strategies are linear in
players’ types. It requires further investigation to find the conditions for which the backward-forward
methodology could be extended to infinite time-horizon dynamic games, with either expected discounted
or time-average cost criteria. Such a methodology for infinite time-horizon could be useful to characterize
steady state behavior of the games. Specifically, for time homogenous dynamic LQG games with
asymmetric information (where matrices Ai,Bi are time independent), under the required technical
conditions for which such a methodology is applicable, the steady state behavior can be characterized
by the fixed point equation in matrices (Li,Σi,Vi)i=1,2 through (18), (30b) and (33), where the time
index is dropped in these equations, i.e. for i = 1, 2,
1. Σ = φs(Σ,L) (38)
2.
(
Dui†V¯iDui
)
Li = −Dui†V¯i[Dei]1 (39)
3. Vi = Fi†V¯iFi, (40)
where V¯i =


Ti Si 0
Si† Pi 0
0 0 Vi

.
Observe that in the above equations the matrices Vi and V¯i do not appear as functions of Σ, as
in the finite horizon case described in (22), (33b), in the proof of Theorem 1. The reason for that is
as follows. The steady state behavior for a general dynamic game with asymmetric information and
independent types, if it exists, would involve fixed point equation in value functions (V i(·))i. However,
for the LQG case, it reduces to a fixed point equation in (V i(Σ))i, i.e. value functions evaluated at
a specific value of Σ. This is so because the functions V i are evaluated at Σ and φ(Σ,L), which at
steady state are exactly the same (see (38)). As a result, the fixed point equation reduces to the three
algebraic equations as shown above with variables the matrices Σ, L, V¯ and V, which represents an
enormous reduction in complexity.
1) Numerical examples: In this section, we present numerically found solutions for steady state,
assuming that our methodology extends to the infinite horizon problem for the model considered. We
assume Bi = 0 which implies that the state process (X it)t∈T is uncontrolled.
1. For i = 1, 2, mi = 1, ni = 2,Ai = 0.9I,Bi = 0,Qi = I,
T1 =

 I 14I
1
4
I 0

 , T2 =

 0 14I
1
4
I I

 , P1 =

I 0
0 0

 ,
P2 =

0 0
0 I

 , S1 =

1 0
0 0

 , S2 =

0 0
0 1

 , (41)
there exists a symmetric solution as, for i = 1, 2,
Li = −
[
1.062 1.062
]
,Σi =

 3.132 −2.132
−2.132 3.132

 . (42)
2. For i = 1, 2, mi = 2, ni = 2,A1 =

0.9 0
0 0.8

 ,A2 = 0.9I, and Bi,Ti,Pi,Si used as before with
appropriate dimensions, there exists a solution,
L1 = −

1.680 1.600
0.191 0.286

 , L2 = −

1.363 1.363
1.363 1.363


Σ1 = I, Σ2 =

 3.132 −2.132
−2.132 3.132

 . (43)
It is interesting to note that for player 1, where A1 does not weigh the two components equally,
the corresponding L1 is full rank, and thus reveals her complete private information. Whereas for
player 2, where A2 has equal weight components, the corresponding L2 is rank deficient, which
implies, at equilibrium player 2 does not completely reveal her private information. Also it is easy
to check from (14b) that with full rank Li matrices, steady state Σi = Qi.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a two-player dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information and perfect
recall where players’ private types evolve as independent controlled Markov processes. We show that
under certain conditions, there exist strategies that are linear in players’ private types which, together
with Gaussian beliefs, form a PBE of the game. We show this by specializing the general methodology
developed in [13] to our model. Specifically, we prove that (a) the common beliefs remain Gaussian under
the strategies that are linear in players’ types where we find update equations for the corresponding mean
and covariance processes; (b) using the backward recursive approach of [13], we compute an equilibrium
generating function θ by solving a fixed point equation in linear deterministic partial strategies γt for
all possible common beliefs and all time epochs. Solving this fixed point equation reduces to solving
a matrix algebraic equation for each realization of the state estimate covariance matrices. Also, the
cost-to-go value functions are shown to be quadratic in private type and state estimates. This result is
one of the very few results available on finding signaling perfect Bayesian equilibria of a truly dynamic
game with asymmetric information.
APPENDIX I
This lemma could be interpreted as Theorem 2.30 in [1, Ch. 7] with appropriate matrix substitution
where specifically, their observation matrix Ck should be substituted by our Lk. We provide an alternate
proof here for convenience.
piit+1 is updated from piit through (6). Since piit is Gaussian, γit(uit|xit) = δ(uit − Litxit −mit) is a linear
deterministic constraint and kernel Qi is Gaussian, thus piit+1 is also Gaussian. We find its mean and
covariance as follows.
We know that xit+1 = Aitxit +Bitut + wit. Then,
E[X it+1|pi
i
t, γ
i
t, ut]
= E[AitX
i
t +B
i
tUt +W
i
t |pi
i
t, γ
i
t, ut] (44a)
= AitE[X
i
t |pi
i
t, γ
i
t, ut] +B
i
tut (44b)
= AitE[X
i
t |L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t] +B
i
tut (44c)
where (44b) follows because W it has mean zero. Suppose there exists a matrixGit such that X it−GitLitX it
and LitX it are independent. Then
E[X it
∣∣∣LitX it = uit −mit] (45a)
= E[X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t +G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t
∣∣∣LitX it = uit −mit] (45b)
= E[X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t ] +G
i
t(u
i
t −m
i
t) (45c)
= xˆit +G
i
t(u
i
t − L
i
txˆ
i
t −m
i
t), (45d)
where Git satisfies
E[(X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t)(L
i
tX
i
t)
†]
= E[(X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t)]E[(L
i
tX
i
t)
†] (46a)
(I−GitL
i
t)E[X
i
tX
i†
t ]L
i†
t = (I−G
i
tL
i
t)E[X
i
t ]E[X
i†
t ]L
i†
t (46b)
(I−GitL
i
t)(Σ
i
t + xˆ
i
txˆ
i†
t )L
i†
t = (I−G
i
tL
i
t)xˆ
i
txˆ
i†
t L
i†
t (46c)
Git = Σ
i
tL
i†
t (L
i
tΣ
i
tL
i†
t )
−1. (46d)
Σit+1 = sm
(
AitX
i
t − E[A
i
tX
i
t |L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t]|L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t
)
+Qi (47a)
Now
sm
(
X it − E[X
i
t |L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t]|L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t
) (48a)
= sm
(
(X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t)− (E[X
i
t −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t |L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t])|L
i
tX
i
t = u
i
t −m
i
t
) (48b)
= sm
(
(X it −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t)− (E[X
i
t −G
i
tL
i
tX
i
t ])
) (48c)
= sm
(
(I−GitL
i
t)(X
i
t − E[X
i
t ])
) (48d)
= (I−GitL
i
t)Σ
i
t(I−G
i
tL
i
t)
† (48e)
APPENDIX II
We prove the lemma for player 1 and the result follows for player 2 by similar arguments. For the
scope of this appendix, we define B¯1t =


B11,t
B11,t
B21,t

 and for any matrix V, we define V∗i,Vi∗ as the ith
column and the ith row of V, respectively. Then the fixed point equation (30) can be written as,
0 =
[
T111 + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V122,t+1(A
1
tG
1
t )+
B¯
1†
t V
1
∗2,t+1A
1
tG
1
t + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V12∗,t+1B¯
1
t + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t
]
L1t
+
[
S
1†
11 + (A
1
tG
1
t )
†V121,t+1A
1
t + B¯
1†
t V
1
∗1,t+1A
1
t
]
. (49)
It should be noted that Vit+1 is a function of Σt+1, which is updated through Σt and Lt as Σt+1 =
φs(Σt,Lt) (we drop this dependence here for ease of exposition). SubstitutingG1t = Σ1tL1†t (L1tΣ1tL1†t )−1
and multiplying (49) by (L1tΣ1tL1†t ) from left and (Σ1tL1†t ) from right, we get
0 = L1tΣ
1
t
[
L
1†
t (T
1
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t )L
1
t +A
1†
t V
1
22,t+1A
1
t
+ L1†t (B¯
1†
t V
1
∗2,t+1A
1
t + S
1†
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
∗1,t+1A
1
t )
+(A1†t V
1
2∗,t+1B¯
1
t +A
1†
t V
1
21,t+1A
1
t )L
1
t
]
Σ1tL
1†
t (50)
Let L¯it = Lit(Σit)1/2, A¯it = Ait(Σit)1/2,
Λ1a(Lt) := T
1
11 + B¯
1†
t V
1
t+1B¯
1
t (51a)
Λ1b(Lt) := A¯
1†
t V
1
22,t+1A¯
1
t (51b)
Λ1c(Lt) := B¯
1†
t V
1
∗2,t+1A¯
1
t + S
1†
11(Σ
1
t )
1/2 + B¯1†t V
1
∗1,t+1A¯
1
t (51c)
Λ1d(Lt) := A¯
1†
t V
1
2∗,t+1B¯
1
t + A¯
1†
t V
1
21,t+1A¯
1
t . (51d)
Then,
0 = L¯1t L¯
1†
t Λ
1
a(Lt)L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
tΛ
1
b(Lt)L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t Λ
1
c(Lt)L¯
1†
t + L¯
1
tΛ
1
d(Lt)L¯
1
t L¯
1†
t (52)
Since m=1, Λ1a is a scalar. Let L¯it = λili†, where λi = ||L¯it||2 and li is a normalized vector and t1 = T11.
Moreover, since the update of Σt in (14b) is scaling invariant, V1t+1 only depends on the directions
l = (l1, l2). Then, (52) reduces to the following quadratic equation in λ1
(λ1)2Λ1a(l) + λ
1(Λ1c(l)l
1 + l1†Λ1d(l)) + l
1†Λ1b(l)l
1 = 0. (53)
There exists a real-valued solution3 of this quadratic equation in λ1 if and only if
(Λc(l)l
1 + l1†Λ1d(l))
2 ≥ 4Λ1a(l)l
1†Λ1b(l)l
1 (54a)
l1†(Λ1†c (l)Λ
1
c(l) +Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1†
d (l) + 2Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1
c(l)− 4Λ
1
a(l)Λ
1
b(l))l
1 ≥ 0. (54b)
Let ∆1(l) := (Λ1†c (l)Λ1c(l) +Λ1d(l)Λ
1†
d (l) + 2Λ
1
d(l)Λ
1
c(l)− 4Λ
1
a(l)Λ
1
b(l)). (55)
There exists a solution to the fixed point equation (30) if and only if ∃l1, l2 ∈ Rn such that l1†∆1(l)l1 ≥ 0,
3Note that a negative sign of λ1 can be absorbed in l1.
or sufficiently ∆1(l) +∆1†(l) is positive definite.
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